STATE OF NEW MEXICO
COUNTY OF SANTA FE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STEPHANIE GARCIA RICHARD, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff,

v. **No. D-101-CV-2026-02727**

NEW MEXICO OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION AND INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from a rulemaking by the Commissioner of Public Lands ("Commissioner") amending Rule 19.2.100.23 NMAC, during which the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association ("NMOGA") and the Independent Petroleum Association of New Mexico ("IPANM") maintained that the proposed amendments are *ultra vires* and violate their members' constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights. On September 28, 2026, the Commissioner announced by press release that the amended Rule ("Final Rule") had taken effect and that she had filed this declaratory judgment action, stating she "will not be intimidated by threats from oil and gas corporations to challenge [her] statutory and constitutional authority[.]"[1]

The Commissioner has it backwards. Citizens who defend their rights and seek judicial review of a state officer's actions are neither intimidating nor threatening—such scrutiny is part and parcel of the privilege of public service. The Commissioner cannot preempt judicial review by suing under a statute that gives her no authority to do so.

Under the New Mexico Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA"), only a "person" may "obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations[.]" NMSA 1978, §44-6-4. The term "person" is limited—it is defined as "any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever." NMSA 1978, § 44-6-3. As a state officer, the Commissioner is not a "person" under this definition, and this action should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal is independently required because only the Attorney General may sue on behalf of a state officer, but the Attorney General did not bring this suit. And even if the Commissioner could sue, the Court

[1] *See* https://www.nmstatelands.org/2026/09/28/commissioner-garcia-richard-requires-stronger-financial-protections-for-oil-and-gas-development-on-state-lands/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2026).

should decline to entertain her narrow declaratory claim, which would not resolve the other disputes already pending in the Fifth Judicial District Court.

LEGAL STANDARD

This motion is premised on the Commissioner's lack of statutory standing. *See Lopez v. Presbyterian Healthcare Serv.*, 2025-NMSC-031, ¶ 11, 578 P.3d 1089 ("[S]tatutory standing asks whether the plaintiff has satisfied certain statutory preconditions to judicial review."). As such, the motion presents a facial challenge to this Court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 1-012(B)(1) NMRA. *See AFSCME v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs*, 2016-NMSC-017, ¶ 31, 373 P.3d 989 ("Under New Mexico's Declaratory Judgment Act, standing—like ripeness—is a jurisdictional prerequisite."). The Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint. *See South v. Lujan*, 2014-NMCA-109, ¶ 8, 336 P.3d 1000. "Whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a particular matter is a question of law[.]" *El Castillo Ret. Residences v. Martinez*, 2015-NMCA-041, ¶ 13, 346 P.3d 1164.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING

A. The Commissioner Is Not a "Person" Under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

This matter presents a pure question of law: whether the Commissioner—an elected official whose office is part of the State's executive department and is the executive officer of the State Land Office, *see* N.M. Const. art. V, § 1, and NMSA 1978, § 19-1-1—is a proper plaintiff under the DJA, NMSA 1978, §§ 44-6-1 *et seq. See Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria*, 1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066 (interpretation of a statute is a question of law); *see also Martinez*, 2015-NMCA-041, ¶ 13. Because she is not, this matter must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *See ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque*, 2008-NMSC-045, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d 1222 ("When a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may sue, the issue of standing becomes

interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing then becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action."); *AFSCME*, 2016-NMSC-017, ¶ 14 ("If a statute creates a right and provides that only a specific class of persons may petition for judicial review of an alleged violation, then the courts lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate that alleged violation when the petition is brought by a person outside of that class.").

The DJA provides that "[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." § 44-6-4. "Person" is defined as "any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever." § 44-6-3. The DJA further provides that "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding." NMSA 1978, 44-6-12. Lastly, "the state of New Mexico, or any official thereof, may be sued and declaratory judgment entered when the rights, status or other legal relations of the parties call for a construction of the constitution of the state of New Mexico, the constitution of the United States or any of the laws of the state of New Mexico or the United States, or any statute thereof." NMSA 1978, § 44-6-13. Thus, the Legislature expressly authorized declaratory actions against the state and its officials, but nowhere authorized the state or its officials to initiate an action under the DJA.

Under governing rules of statutory construction, the "plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent." *High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque*, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 970 P.2d 599 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Hence, the oft repeated maxim that 'a statute means what it says.'" *Hendricks v. Hendricks*, 1950-NMSC-069, ¶

66, 226 P.2d 464 (citation omitted). Courts "give the words used in the statute their ordinary meaning unless the legislature indicates a different intent[,]" and "will not read into a statute or ordinance language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written." *High Ridge Hinkle*, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A statute is also "read in connection with other statutes concerning the same subject matter." *Quantum Corp. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1998-NMCA-050, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 49, 956 P.2d 848.

The language of Section 44-6-3 is plain: "person" means "any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society or municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever." § 44-6-3. The only public entities it lists are municipalities and public corporations. *Id.* There is no basis to conclude the Legislature intended to include state officials such as the Commissioner. *See Sims v. Sims*, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 17, 930 P.2d 153 ("[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.") (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); *see also Lucero v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc.*, 2002-NMCA-013, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d 739 ("[A]bsent express words to the contrary, neither the state nor its subdivisions are included within general words of a statute.").

As our Supreme Court has observed, "[w]hen the legislature has wanted to include sovereigns or other governmental bodies in its statutes, it has known how to do so." *Southern Union Gas Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Com'n*, 1971-NMSC-035, ¶ 7, 482 P.2d 913, *overruled on other grounds in De Vargas Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Santa Fe v. Campbell*, 1975-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 535 P.2d 1320. And in those instances, it has done so by defining "person" in different contexts as including "the state of New Mexico or any political subdivision thereof[,]" a "governmental subdivision or public or private organization of any character[,]" "the state and all of its political subdivisions[,]"

the "state or political subdivision or agency thereof or any body politic[,]" or a "government or political subdivision, public corporation, [or] public authority." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); *see also, e.g.*, NMSA 1978, § 57-1-1.2 (defining "person" under the Antitrust Act as including, in relevant part, "any governmental or other legal entity with the exception of the state"). Similarly, while the Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act defines "person" as including, in relevant part, "any legal [ ] entity[,]" NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-3(E), this broad catch-all is absent from the DJA.[2] Where, as here, "the legislature . . . did not see fit to include or even mention [the state] or governmental agencies" in the definition of "person," courts may not read those categories into it. *Southern Union*, 1971-NMSC-035, ¶ 8; *see also Stansell v. N.M. Lottery*, 2009-NMCA-062, ¶ 12, 211 P.3d 214 ("Since the Legislature did not include any governmental body or the [N.M.] Lottery within the [Unfair Practices Act's] definition of 'person,' the Lottery is not subject to the UPA.").

That the Commissioner is not a "person" under the DJA is further confirmed by Sections 44-6-12 and -13. Under the former, "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding." § 44-6-12. Under the latter, "the state of New Mexico, or any official thereof, *may be sued* and declaratory judgment entered when the rights, status or other legal relations of the parties call for a construction of" state or federal laws. § 44-6-13 (emphasis added). If "all persons" who must be made parties under Section 44-6-12 as plaintiffs or defendants included "the state of New Mexico, or any official thereof," the Legislature would not have needed to specify in Section 44-6-13 that the State and its officials "may be sued" as defendants. *See AFSCME*, 2013-

[2] The Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act does not apply to the DJA because it was enacted after the DJA. *See* NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-1(A).

NMCA-063, ¶ 5 ("Statutes must also be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous."). Notably, Section 44-6-13 "does not have the effect of general consent to be sued[.]" *Gill v. Public Emples. Ret. Bd. of the Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n of N.M.*, 2004-NMSC-016, ¶ 11, 90 P.3d 491. Instead, its purpose is to create an additional class of defendants not already listed as "persons" in Section 44-6-12. *Id.* (section 44-6-13 "merely permits parties to sue the state when the state's consent to be sued otherwise exists.").

"Where a statute gives the cause of action, and designates the persons who may sue, they alone are authorized to bring suit." *Ickes v. Brimhall*, 1938-NMSC-036, ¶ 12, 79 P.2d 942 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the DJA is "declared to be remedial[,]" NMSA 1978, § 44-6-14, its remedial purpose cannot overcome its plain meaning as written, *see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell*, 549 U.S. 158, 171 (2007) ("[A] statute's remedial purpose cannot compensate for the lack of a statutory basis."). Because the Commissioner is not a "person" who may "obtain a declaration" under the DJA, § 44-6-4, she lacks statutory standing, and this matter should be dismissed with prejudice. *See also Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp.*, 1996-NMSC-064, ¶ 10, 928 P.2d 250 (unless a statute violates the Constitution, New Mexico courts "will not question the wisdom, policy, or justness of legislation enacted by our Legislature.").

B. Only the Attorney General May Bring a Lawsuit on Behalf of the Commissioner.

This matter should also be dismissed because it was filed by the Commissioner's general counsel rather than by the Attorney General, who alone may bring a civil action on behalf of a state officer such as the Commissioner.

A legal action by or against the Commissioner is an action by or against the State of New Mexico. *See State ex rel. Del Curto v. Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial Dist.*, 1947-NMSC-032, ¶ 3, 183 P.2d 607 ("[A]n action against the Commissioner . . . is an action against the state[.]"). The

Legislature "has the power to direct how, when, where, and by whom the state shall be represented in all matters, whether of litigation or otherwise." *State ex rel. Clancy v. Hall*, 1917-NMSC-070, ¶ 12, 168 P. 715. It has assigned that responsibility to the Attorney General, who "shall . . . prosecute . . . all actions and proceedings brought by . . . any state officer . . . in [her] official capacity[.]" NMSA 1978, § 8-5-2(C); *see also* NMSA 1978, Section 36-1-19(A) ("[N]o one shall represent the state . . . in any matter in which the state . . . is interested except the attorney general, his legally appointed and qualified assistants . . . and such associate counsel as may appear on order of the court, with the consent of the attorney general[.]"). "Prosecute" includes "the power and the duty to" initiate civil lawsuits. *State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Sav. & Loan Ass'n*, 1981-NMSC-108, ¶¶ 6-7, 636 P.2d 279. The Attorney General may delegate these powers and duties by special commission. *See Abreau v. N.M. C.Y.F.D.*, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1259, *1269 (D.N.M. 2009).

The Commissioner's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment ("SLO Complaint") was filed "by and through undersigned counsel[.]" SLO Complaint at 1. It is signed by the Commissioner's general counsel. *Id.* at 13. There is no allegation or indication that the Commissioner's general counsel acted pursuant to a special commission from the Attorney General. *Id.* Because no statute grants the Commissioner independent authority to appear in, let alone commence, litigation without Attorney General representation, the SLO Complaint should be dismissed. *Cf. Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n*, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 10, 206 P.3d 135 (holding that the "ordinary reading" of a statute stating that "[an agency] through the Attorney General shall bring suit" "affirmatively requires that the Attorney General bring suit on behalf of the [agency.]'") (italics and brackets omitted).

II. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

This Court "is vested with broad discretion to grant or refuse claims for declaratory relief." *Headen v. D'Antonio*, 2011-NMCA-058, ¶ 6, 253 P.3d 957 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It should decline to exercise that discretion here because resolving the SLO Complaint "[will] not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." NMSA 1978, § 44-6-7; *see also Missions Ins. Co. v. Puritan Fashions Corp.*, 706 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1983) (in affirming dismissal of first-filed declaratory judgment action, holding the district court properly "acted within its discretion in considering the anticipatory nature of [the dismissed] suit.").

The Commissioner filed this action the very day the Final Rule took effect, while the time for NMOGA and IPANM to seek judicial review of the Final Rule was still running. *See* SLO Complaint ¶ 34; *see also* Rule 1-075(D).[3] Indeed, she admitted in her press release that this action is anticipatory. *See supra* at 1. "Anticipatory suits are disfavored because they are an aspect of forum-shopping." *Puritan Fashions Corp.*, 706 F.2d at 602, fn. 3.

On October 13, 2026, NMOGA and IPANM timely filed their Rule 1-075 appeal in the Fifth Judicial District Court. *See NMOGA et al. v. The New Mexico State Land Office et al.*, D-506-CV-2026-01199, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed Oct. 13, 2026. Together with their appeal, NMOGA and IPANM filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus as well as a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Unconstitutional Retaliation, and Inspection of Public Records Act ("IPRA") Violation. *Id.* (collectively, "NMOGA Complaint"). The Commissioner's

[3] The Commissioner accomplished this by, contrary to her regulations, withholding notification that an order adopting the Final Rule had been entered on September 10, 2026, for 18 days. *See* 19.2.16.12 NMAC (requiring that "a copy of the commissioner's order shall be sent to all persons who submitted written comments and provided an address, and if a public hearing was held, all persons who were present at the hearing[.]"); *see also* Ex. A.

rush to the courthouse notwithstanding, adjudicating her claim would resolve none of NMOGA and IPANM's causes of action. *See Puritan Fashions Corp.*, 706 F.2d at 602 n.3 (affirming dismissal of first-filed declaratory judgment action after finding "indications that forum-shopping was an element in this case").

First, NMOGA and IPANM's Rule 1-075 appeal is an independent, mandatory proceeding under the Fifth Judicial District Court's appellate jurisdiction. *See* Rule 1-075(T) (district court sits "in its appellate capacity"); *see also Smith v. City of Santa Fe*, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 23-24, 171 P.3d 300 (parties that participate in administrative proceedings must pursue Rule 1-075 appeal). It seeks, *inter alia*, review of whether the Final Rule's financial assurance amounts and reporting requirements are arbitrary and capricious—issues not addressed in the SLO Complaint. *See* NMOGA Complaint at 25. Adjudicating the SLO Complaint thus will not terminate the appeal or the parties' controversy over the Final Rule. *See* § 44-6-7.

Second, NMOGA and IPANM's Petition for Writ of Mandamus seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner to rescind her order promulgating and approving the Final Rule and enjoining her from enforcing the earlier version of the Rule. *See* NMOGA Complaint at 29. This action addresses neither the validity of the prior Rule, 19.2.100.23 NMAC (2019), nor does it address any injunctive relief. Thus, a decision by this Court would not terminate these aspects of the parties' dispute.

Third, NMOGA and IPANM's declaratory judgment claim is broader than the Commissioner's. The Commissioner seeks two declarations: (1) that "[t]he Commissioner validly exercised her legal authority to promulgate the [Final] Rule;" and (2) that "[t]he [Final] Rule is consistent with, and does not violate, the statutory lease forms and other applicable statutes and laws[.]" SLO Complaint at 12. By contrast, NMOGA and IPANM allege that "the Final Rule is

invalid because it exceeds the Commissioner's and SLO's constitutional authority and usurps the constitutional authority of the New Mexico Legislature; exceeds the Commissioner's and SLO's statutory authority; constitutes a law impairing the obligations of contracts; and violates NMOGA and IPANM members' constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights." NMOGA Complaint at 15. NMOGA and IPANM further seek declarations that the Final Rule must be invalidated in its entirety because it lacks a severability provision, and that invalidating it does not revive the equally unlawful 2019 Rule. *Id.* at 15-16. Despite the Commissioner's broad assertion that the Final Rule is "consistent with . . . other applicable statutes and laws[,]" SLO Complaint at 12, her allegations do not address separation of powers, the Contract Clause, the protection against unreasonable seizures, due process, severability, or the status of the 2019 Rule. *See* SLO Complaint generally. Even if the Court deems the issues in the two declaratory judgment claims to be similar, dismissal is still proper. *See Abbott Lab'ys v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967) ("A court may even in its discretion dismiss a declaratory judgment or injunctive suit if the same issue is pending in litigation elsewhere.").

Fourth, NMOGA also brings related causes of action for unconstitutional retaliation and IPRA violations arising out of the same rulemaking. *See* NMOGA Complaint at 16-23. Neither of these causes of action would be addressed, let alone "terminate[d]," should this Court adjudicate the Commissioner's declaratory judgment claim.

Unlike the Commissioner's narrow claim, the Fifth Judicial District Court action will completely settle the parties' disputes stemming from the Final Rule. Proceeding here would only fragment multiple disputes across two courts, require duplicative litigation, and risk inconsistent rulings on the validity of the same rule. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the SLO Complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, NMOGA and IPANM respectfully request that the SLO Complaint be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.

November 9, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on November 9, 2026, a copy of the foregoing was filed through the court's CM/ECF system, causing it to be served by electronic mail upon all counsel of record.

/s/ Olga Serafimova
Olga Serafimova

EXHIBIT A

From: Heltman, Elaine G. <eheltman@nmslo.gov>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2026 3:37 PM
To: nanking1224@earthlink.net; frytki40@gmail.com; naima9alma@gmail.com; sstuartstudio@gmail.com; speirce@prodigy.net; rjpeirce@prodigy.net; alasdair.d.lindsay@gmail.com; lurabrookins@gmail.com; jmargerum1@gmail.com; coachdugger@gmail.com; mason87104 @gmail.com; swlight1@gmail.com; megmeltz.nm@gmail.com; breakline23@gmail.com; ritalink9 @gmail.com; robhnm@gmail.com; rgmittan@gmail.com; lydiadavis174@gmail.com; katherin.hinton@gmail.com; bigmoneyoutofpolitics@gmail.com; mpluzier@gmail.com; graygrammarian@gmail.com; stevecollins45@gmail.com; mprandoni@gmail.com; pelican730f@gmail.com; emilyaseverance@gmail.com; amenoartemis@gmail.com; tntalbot56 @gmail.com; misscgwhee@gmail.com; bullhoffy@gmail.com; peggyfroelich@gmail.com; rubyoland@gmail.com; joaquin@zeroedesign.com; amyliv@gmail.com; victorialhern@gmail.com; danielrsjuu08@gmail.com; jamessimone9@gmail.com; oxsusiexo@gmail.com; jeffsilesky@gnail.com; mhrussell100@gmail.com; speirce@prodigy.net; kay99zoe@gmail.com; bo.cinesthetic.30.yx@gmail.com; irero1331@gmail.com; epicherping@gmail.com; datfackler@gmail.com; pgoodkind@gmail.com; carlybaca1010@gmail.com; ricamaestas@gmail.com; pvtrhoulam@gmail.com; nataliegutierrez012@gmail.com; gregjade@gmail.com; barry@hwgoldberg.com; isabellabotello8@gmail.com; ismatmscaff@gmail.com; ismatmscaff@gmail.com; thompson.online@gmail.com; graciaalan343@gmail.com; hauckb45 @gmail.com; leilagreen66@gmail.com; success.josephine00tucker@gmail.com; oeillist@gmail.com; ann.l.gibson@gmail.com; nanibahchacon@gmail.com; joshuabeltran2121@gmail.com; badxam07 @gmail.com; trevorvigil.tv@gmail.com; kenners8228@gmail.com; sarahclaudia.s@gmail.com; tarangodom@gmail.com; steve@wolffmann.us; stellalynne87@gmail.com; debbohler@gmail.com; binsworth@gmail.com; gabriellecordova328@gmail.com; hayleyharperdesigns@gmail.com; Lteffeau@gmail.com; nikapmm@gmail.com; nmmom2@gmail.com; nicolebeautyway@gmail.com; hibbsemily78@gmail.com; katja_960@hotmail.com; bookravens@gmail.com; ariachiodo@gmail.com; daniruthere@hotmail.com; jayveater.lmt@gmail.com; bettydaystokes@hotmail.com; DianeAbqNM@gmail.com; 1kolibri2@gmail.com; nomnom1620@gmail.com; pam@wolffmann.us; pixiejacobs0@gmail.com; cnpodsiadlo@gmail.com; polier505@gnail.com; mags4swim@gmail.com; jacquelinecjaramillo@gmail.com; 5000wave@gmail.com; whycantwealljustcheer@gmail.com; hopeloma1@gmail.com; crispethan@gmail.com; aznarepse575@gmail.com; evalyn@newmexico.com; giacomo38@hotmail.com; ecocathy@gmail.com; modharma@gmail.com; kevin@kmskelly.com; bigmoneyoutofpolitics@gmail.com; wriker@mindspring.com; diannawoods13 @gmail.com; dav.nat.goldberg@gmail.com; marion@newmexico.com; mason87104@gmail.com; momolujan@gmail.com; raamplex@gmail.com; lisanawhitehouae@gmail.com; katherine_shera@protonmail.com; denizmbm@gmail.com; careynm@gmail.com; jeffsilesky@gmail.com; loralucero3@gmail.com; marthamdelrio@gmail.com; deanna.doran@gmail.com; dggibso@gmail.com; karensmithnm@gmail.com; caitlyn.brown@gmail.com; emtorres92@gmail.com; mmsho@msn.com; bertaprice@gmail.com; michellebarrows.cs@gmail.com; nanking1224@earthlink.net; soaglow@gmail.com; drbrucesogolow@gmail.com; sselbin24@gmail.com; erinfg@gmail.com; rubyoland@gmail.com; sam@wildwatershed.org; sayrahn@hotmail.com; barbarawisoff@gmail.com; catana@newenergyeconomy.org; starowl3@hotmail.com; moonflowersea6@gmail.com; jude@cnsp.net; yazh.yuccapolicy@gmail.com; wlaughlin1@gmail.com; glennwikle@gmail.com; nikkibnk224@gmail.com; prescottdavidp@gmail.com; leahbmiller1307@gmail.com; sarajhenning@gmail.com; mjw8012@gmail.com; danleeb@hotmail.com; funky.are@gmail.com; storyscapes108@gmail.com; leeondra13@gmail.com; avelina@newmexico.com; ddirving@gmail.com; lynbark65@gmail.com; annieb8@msn.com; iallenara@gmail.com; daphneswancutt@gmail.com; justin20friedman@gmail.com; potatoroaster85@gmail.com; alasdair.d.lindsay@gmail.com; maryghthomas@gmail.com; sandydan@prodigy.net;

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Cc: Biernoff, Ari; Stewart, Sunalei
Subject: New Mexico State Land Office Oil and Gas Bonding Rule

External Email

Good afternoon.

You are receiving this email because you (or an organization on whose behalf you appeared) have been engaged in the rulemaking process regarding the New Mexico State Land Office's proposed amendment to its financial assurance (bonding) rule for oil and gas leasing. The Commissioner has promulgated a final rule, which was published in the New Mexico Register on September 22, 2026, and goes into effect today, September 28, 2026.

For the text of the final (as-adopted) rule amendment and related information, please see NMSLO's website at the following link:

https://www.nmstatelands.org/bonding/

Thank you for your interest in and comments regarding this rule.

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